INTRODUCTION Do COMPETITIVE MARKETS aggregate information efficiently? This question has been answered in the affirmative by
and Milgrom (1979 and 1981) in an auction context and more recently by Palfrey (1985) in a Cournot model. Wilson (1977) considers a first-price auction in which buyers have some private information about the common value of the good to be sold and shows (under certain regularity conditions) that as the number of bidders goes to infinity the maximum bid is almost surely equal to the true value. Milgrom (1979) obtains a necessary and sufficient information condition for convergence in probability to the true value. The Vickrey auction has the same type of limiting properties also (Milgrom (1981) ). Palfrey (1985) considers a Cournot market with constant marginal costs where firms have private information about the uncertain demand but are otherwise identical. He shows, under mild regularity conditions on the information structure, that the random market price converges almost surely to the full information competitive price as the number of firms goes to infinity. A similar result has been obtained also by Li (1985) . According to these analyses, in the limit competitive market the full information first best outcome prevails even though no firm knows the true state of demand.
All these convergence properties hold in a context where information is exogenous and agents (bidders or firms) do not observe any aggregate market statistic before making their decisions; they can only condition on their private information. The results obtained when the market mechanism is an auction or of the Cournot type suggest, as Palfrey puts it, "that in large enough markets, diverse private information does not drastically alter the conclusion reached by the idealized Walrasian model of pricing in a full information world" (Palfrey (1985, p. 80) ). In other words there should be no welfare loss with respect to the full information first best in competitive markets with incomplete information.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the above conjecture in the context of the Coumot model. We will examine the asymptotic properties of BayesianCournot equilibria under different assumptions about technology, the information acquisition process, and market observables. Two main conclusions emerge from our analysis (with the possible exception of constant returns environments): (a) there is a welfare loss with respect to the first best in large Cournot (or almost competitive) markets with incomplete information, and (b) a competitive market is second best efficient when taking as given the decentralized private information structure of the economy.
Conclusion (a) is based on a very simple idea. Consider a large Cournot or almost competitive market where firms receive private (and costless) noisy signals about the uncertain demand and have identical decreasing returns to scale technologies. A necessary condition for full information first best efficiency is that conditional on the true state of demand identical firms produce at the same marginal cost, but this is incompatible with firms having different appraisals of demand when marginal costs are increasing. In purely statistical terms there simply do not exist decentralized production strategies (equilibrium or not) which yield asymptotically efficient behavior. Therefore, there is in general a welfare loss due to incomplete information in a competitive market except if marginal costs are constant. With constant returns to scale only total output matters for welfare purposes and, again in purely statistical terms, a necessary condition for the market to be efficient is that there exist an unbiased estimator of the first best supply. Palfrey and Li's regularity assumptions on the information structure do imply the existence of such an estimator.
In general, then, a large Coumot market will not aggregate information efficiently although if firms were to pool their information the aggregate statistic would be a perfect signal and we would obtain the full information Walrasian outcome.2 Conclusion (b) makes the point that if we insist on decentralized decision making the market does as well as possible. More precisely, the market works like a team where decentralized production rules are assigned to firms to maximize expected total surplus. This result follows easily from Radner's work on team theory (Radner (1962) ).
Considering models with liner demand, quadratic costs, and affine information structure we are able to obtain closed-form solutions and to compute the welfare loss explicitly, showing that it is decreasing with the precision of the information of the firms and increasing with the basic uncertainty of demand. The inefficiency of large Cournot markets with private information is reinforced when considering endogenous acquisition of information.3 In this case the first best outcome with decreasing returns to scale can only be attained if the cost of information is zero. Otherwise there is always a welfare loss. Nevertheless, as before, a planner could not improve upon the market if only decentralized strategies are feasible. In a competitive market with negligible agents a firm has the right (second best) incentives to acquire information. We show that the equilibrium precision of information purchased is declining in its cost and increasing in the prior variability of the uncertain demand. With constant returns to scale the analysis is more delicate. No equilibrium exists with costly information acquisition in a purely competitive market. Firms cannot make any profits at the market stage contingent on the information they receive (if they did they would expand output indefinitely). Therefore no equilibrium with positive research is possible. But if no firm does research then there are enormous incentives for a firm to buy information and consequently no equilibrium exists. Nevertheless this argument is no longer valid if firms retain some (maybe very small) monopoly power. In fact we can show that by replicating appropriately the market, so that monopoly power vanishes, equilibrium with endogenous information acquisition exists and approaches the first best outcome.
We may wonder whether the inefficiency arises because we have considered only one-shot competition in the market and therefore we have not given firms the opportunity to learn about demand conditions from prices. We claim that this is not the case: our results can be shown to be robust to the addition of extra rounds of market competition in which the information revealed by past prices can be used by firms. Although prices will be fully revealing in the competitive economy, in the interim period (firms can learn only from past prices) there will be a welfare loss and the incentives to purchase information will be unchanged.
A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE AND OUTLINE OF THE PAPER
It is our contention that the appropriate method to analyze the convergence properties of the Cournot mechanism under incomplete information is to consider replicated markets where demand is replicated at the same time that the number of firms increases since in this manner a well defined competitive limit market is obtained. This methodology is in line with the literature on large Cournot markets with complete information (see Novshek (1980) ), and with the view that the continuum model is the appropriate formalization of a competitive economy (see Aumann (1964) ). In the course of our analysis we will highlight the importance of the replica assumptions. Furthermore, reasoning in the limit economy it is very easy to understand the statistical reasons why a competitive market with incomplete information will not aggregate information efficiently in general and to characterize the equilibrium and its second best properties. This is what is done in Section 3. 3It has already been noted that costly information acquisition may change the convergence properties of the market mechanism be it auction-type (Matthews (1984)) or Cournot-type (Li, McKelvey, and Page (1985)).
The rest of the paper considers models with quadratic payoffs and affine information structure which yield computable Bayesian-Cournot equilibria and parameterize the precision of the information of firms. In Section 4 we check in the context of this model that the Bayesian (competitive) equilibrium of the limit economy is not an artifact of our continuum specification but the limit of Bayesian-Cournot equilibria of the replica markets. Furthermore closed-form solutions are derived for the competitive equilibrium and the associated welfare loss and comparative statics analysis with respect to parameters in the information structure is performed.
Section 5 deals with endogenous information acquisition. We consider a two-stage game where first firms decide how much (precision of) information to purchase and then compete in the market contingent on the chosen precisions. Again closed-form solutions are obtained for the equilibrium in the continuum economy (with decreasing returns to scale) and it is checked that this equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of unique subgame perfect equilibria of the replica markets. Comparative statics and welfare analysis of the competitive equilibrium follow easily.
In Section 6 we examine the robustness of the above results to a situation where firms can learn from past prices. A third stage where firms compete again after having observed the second stage market price is added to the model of Section 5. Concluding remarks follow.
AN HEURISTIC ARGUMENT IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET
Consider a competitive market with downward sloping inverse demand given by p = P(x; 0) where x is per capita output and 9 a random parameter. Firm i receives a noisy estimate of 9, si. The signals received by firms are independently and identically distributed given 9 and, without loss of generality, are unbiased, E(si IH) = 0. There is a continuum of firms indexed by i E [0, 1], each one of them with strictly convex twice-continuously differentiable variable costs given by the function C(.). There are no fixed costs. We will make the convention that the Strong Law of Large Numbers (S.L.L.N.) holds for our continuum economy.4 That is, given 9, the average signal equals 9 almost surely (a.s.). The arguments in this section should be viewed as heuristic; in the other sections we will deal with the continuum case as a limit of finite economies.
In this situation a production strategy for firm i is a function xi(-) which associates an output to the signal received. Suppose thus that we have a market equilibrium characterized by xi( * ), i E [0, 1]; that is, xi( * ), i E [0, 1], is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of our continuum economy.5 xi(si) must maximize E(nils) = xiE(P(x; O)si) -C(xi) where x is average output, x = Jxi(si)di. Note that the 4Note that we have a continuum of iid random variables according to our specification. Judd (1985) has shown that this assumption can be made consistent with measure theory. 5See Schmeidler (1973) for a formulation of Nash equilibrium in nonatomic games with finite strategy spaces and Mas-Colell (1986) for a reformalization of the model in terms of distributions with an application to games of incomplete information. equilibrium must be symmetric, xi(si) = x(si) for all i, since the cost function is strictly convex and identical for all firms and signals are iid (given 0). Consequently the random variables x(si) will be iid (given 0) and their average x(#) will be nonrandom and equal6 to E(x(si)10) according to the S.L.L.N. An interior equilibrium x(.) (that is, one in which x(si) > 0 a.s.) is thus characterized by E(P(x; )js1) = C'(x(si)); given that firm i has received signal si the expected market price must equal marginal production costs.
How does the market outcome compare with the full information first best where total surplus (per capita) is maximized contingent on the true value of 0? Given 0 total surplus (per capita) with average production x is TS(x; 0) = foxP(z; 0) dz -C(x) and, obviously, first best production x0(0) is given by the unique x which solves P(x; 0) = C'(x). If firms were able to pool their private signals they could condition their production to the average signal, which equals 0 a.s., and attain the first best by producing x0(0). Will a competitive market, where each firm can condition its production only on its private information, replicate the first best outcome?
A necessary condition for any (symmetric) production strategy x(.) to be first best optimal is that, conditional on 0, identical firms produce at the same marginal cost, namely, C'(x(si)) = C'(x0(0)) a.s. but with increasing marginal costs this can happen only if x(si) = x0(0) a.s., which is basically the perfect information case. Therefore we should expect a welfare loss in a competitive market with noisy signals since a production strategy which is not based on the average signal cannot attain the first best. Proposition 1 below states the result and a more formal proof follows.
PROPOSITION 1: In a competitive market with symmetric firms with strictly convex costs which receive private noisy signals about an uncertain demand parameter, there is a welfare loss with respect to the full information first best. PROOF: We show that no symmetric production strategy x(-), and therefore in particular no competitive production strategy, can attain the first best. The market expected total surplus (per capita) contingent on 0 is given by E(TSI0) = J(P(z; 0) dz -E(C(x(si))l0). This is strictly less than the first best TS(x0(0); 0) since TS(x0(0); 0) > TS(R(0); 0) > E(TSIO). The first inequality being true since xo is the first best, the second since the cost function is strictly convex, Z(0)=E(x(sj)j0), the signals are noisy (which means that given 0, x(si) is still random) and in consequence C(&x(0)) < E(C(x(si)) I 0). Q.E.D.
In this context and in general a necessary condition for the market outcome to be first best optimal is that marginal costs be constant. Firms will produce then at the 6Equality of random variables has to be understood to hold almost surely. We will not insist on this always. same marginal cost by assumption. This is the situation considered by Palfrey (1985) . He finds that if the information structure is "regular enough" first best efficiency is achieved in the competitive limit. The intuition of the result is simple enough. Suppose that in the above described context marginal costs are zero (without loss of generality) and that inverse demand intersects the axis. Firm i will maximize E(-rjIs1) = xjE(P(2; 0)jsi) where, as before, x is average output. Obviously in this constant returns to scale context a necessary condition for an interior equilibrium to exist is that E(P(x&; 0) Isi) = 0 for almost all si. Looking at symmetric equilibria, xi(si) = x(si) for all i, we know that average production given 0 is nonrandom, x (0) and therefore E(P(x; 0)I0) = P((x; 0)I 0). For first best efficiency we need: E(P(xZ ( If the likelihood matrix is of full rank, i.e., if 1> ' then p=p=0 and the symmetric interior equilibrium is efficient. In the constant returns case in order for the first best optimum to be achieved it is only necessary that total output (conditional on 0) be x0(0). Therefore, a necessary condition for (Bayesian) competitive equilibria to achieve the first best is that there exist some nonnegative valued function x(-) such that E(x(si) 0) = x0(0) for all 0. That is, the function x(.), the firm's output strategy, must be an unbiased estimate of the first best supply x0(0). In this case x(.) is a Bayesian competitive equilibrium since P(x0(0), 0) =0 and Z(0) = E(x(si)IO). Palfrey's conditions again imply that this function exists.
We can view the above results in a purely statistical way. With decreasing returns to scale there are no decentralized (production) strategies which yield an efficient outcome if signals are noisy and therefore a competitive market will not attain the full information first best. With constant returns to scale, if there does not exist an unbiased estimator of the first best supply then again there are no decentralized strategies which yield efficiency and a competitive market will fail to attain the first best.7
7It remains an open question to characterize in general the class of information structures which insure the existence of such an unbiased estimator.
Is, the outcome of the competitive market efficient in some sense in general? In fact it will be efficient given the private information structure of the economy. We show below that the competitive market works like a team where each member follows the decision rule x(.) that maximizes expected total surplus when there is private information. That is, the market solves the team problem with expected total surplus as objective function. The team problem with n firms is to find n decision rules xi(.) which maximize E{TS(X; 0)) = E P ( We are interested in large markets with many firms. We will study the n-firm case and its limit as n goes to infinity. It will be convenient to argue again in the limit competitive case first and then check that the competitive equilibrium is indeed the limit of a unique sequence of Bayesian-Cournot equilibria of the finite economies.
Equilibrium
There is a continuum of firms indexed by i, i E [0,1]. Firm i receives a signal s1 about the uncertain demand intercept 0. The strategy of firm i is thus a function xi(-) which associates an output to the signal received. We will look for Bayesian Nash equilibria of this market. We assume that the signals received by the firms are identically distributed conditional on 0. In this case vi = v and ti= t for all i.
Conditional on having received si firm i will maximize E(jilsi) = E( p si)xiXxi, where p = 0 -/3R and 5 is average production, x = fxi(si) di. Given 5 the optimal response of firm i is xi(si) = E(plsi)/2X provided X > 0, which will be the same for all firms and therefore equilibria will be symmetric. We have then that xi = x for all i and E(ZIsi) = E(x(sj)Isi), j 0 i. The first order condition yields 2Xx(si) = E(O si) -f3E(x(sj)Isi) and it is easily checked that the unique affine function x(@) which satisfies it is given by x(si) = a(si - Table I we see that by increasing t we increase ETS since a is increasing in t (recall that t = a 2/(a2 + v)) and ETS0 stays constant. Q.E.D.
In case (a), why does ETS increase with the precision of information? First, per capita expected consumer surplus (ECS) increases with the precision of information (t) since consumer surplus is a convex function of average output (CS = ,3 2/2) and increases in t increase the slope of x (see Figure 2 ) and make it more variable. Secoxnd, expected profits may increase or decrease with t (see Vives (1986b) for a complete analysis) but the effect on welfare of the consumers always dominates the profit effect. On the other hand increases in a2 benefit both firms and consumers but have a larger effect on the first best than on the market level.
We have claimed that a welfare loss exists with incomplete information and strictly convex costs and furthermore that the inefficiency is inversely related to the precision of information. It is not difficult to imagine that the same will be true replacing quadratic costs by capacity limits; after all, a capacity limit can be interpreted as a very steep marginal cost schedule. This is formally checked in a model with constant marginal costs and capacity limits with a finite support information structure (see Vives (1986a, Section 4)). The qualitative properties of the capacity model are identical to the one analyzed in this section.
INFORMATION ACQUISITION

Do the inefficiencies that we found in the case in which the precision of information was given carry over when information has to be acquired at a cost? The analysis of Mathews (1984), in an auction context, and of Li, McKelvey and Page (1985), in a Cournot context, support the view that costly information acquisition changes the convergence properties of the market mechanism.
We will consider the quadratic-affine model of the last section and assume that firms can acquire additional observations at a constant cost. The precision of information of firm i, l/vi, is proportional to the sample the firm obtains.8 We will suppose then that the cost to firm i of obtaining information with precision l/vi is c/vi where c is a positive constant. Given our information structure it will be more convenient to work with ti. Recalling that ti = a2/(a2 + Vi), for given aJ2 Note that since we are in a competitive situation the payoff to firm i only depends on the average precision of information in the market (t), which firm i cannot influence. Furthermore, the marginal benefit to a firm to acquire information will be decreasing in t-, the (average) amount of information purchased by the other firms. More information in the market reduces the incentive for any firm to do research. The intuitive idea is that a firm wants information to estimate the market price. When firms have better information (t high) the market price varies less since producers match better production decisions with In the constant returns to scale case (X = 0) there is a difficulty: no equilibrium exists for the two-stage game if information acquisition is costly.9 This fact is easily understood. Notice first that in equilibrium it must be the case that no firm makes any profit at the market stage. With constant returns to scale, equilibrium at the second stage implies that the expected value of the market price conditional on the signal received by any firm be nonpositive. Otherwise the firm would expand indefinitely. Therefore firms cannot purchase any information in equilibrium since this would imply negative profits. Furthermore zero expenditures on research are not consistent with equilibrium either. If no firm purchases information there are enormous incentives for any firm to get some information and make unbounded profits under constant returns to scale. With no firm acquiring information the average output in the market is nonrandom and any firm with some information could make unbounded profits by shutting down operations if the expected value of the market price conditional on the received signal is nonpositive and producing an infinite amount otherwise.10
The fact that no equilibrium with endogenous information acquisition exists under constant returns is nevertheless particular to the continuum model. With a finite number (n) of firms the above argument does not hold and it is possible to show that an equilibrium exists. For n large enough the equilibrium involves positive expenditures on research which are declining in n, converging to zero as n goes to infinity. The key observation is that with a finite number of firms 90n this issue I acknowledge a very helpful conversation with Paul Milgrom. l?Notice that the nonexistence argument does not depend on our quadratic-affine specification. Our nonexistence result is reminiscent of Wilson's analysis of informational economies of scale (Wilson (1974) ). Wilson finds that the compounding of constant returns in physical production with information acquisition yields unbounded returns in models where the choice of the decision variable applies the same way to the production of all units of output. Obviously, this implies nonexistence of a competitive equilibrium. Nevertheless in the model in our paper scale (production) is chosen optimally in response to information and therefore it is a "non-example" in Wilson's terminology. expected profits can be positive in the market equilibrium and this way incentives to acquire information are not destroyed. With a large number of firms, given that a firm's rivals are all purchasing a little bit of information, the optimal response of the firm is also to acquire a little information. It is not optimal to purchase zero since the firm improves its expected profits with some information and it is not optimal to do a lot of research since information is costly and the other firms have some information.
The equilibrium we have computed for the continuum economy with decreasing returns to scale (t*) is not an artifact of our specification. It is the limit of a unique sequence of subgame perfect equilibria (S.P.E.) of the replica economies consisting of n firms facing an inverse demand p = 0 -13x/n. In the constant returns to scale case no equilibrium exists with costly research in the continuum economy but zero average expenditure on information (t* = 0) is again the limit of a unique sequence of S.P.E. of the replica economies. When the cost of research is zero, firms obtain perfect information. Proposition 5 states the result and a proof follows. REMARK 1: In the constant returns case it follows from the proof that firms will purchase information (t* > 0) if n is large enough (since a2 > 2c1f3/n for n large enough). Furthermore it also follows easily from the expression of 'pn(t) that t * will be decreasing in n for large n and will eventually converge to 0. With many firms and constant returns, all firms purchase a vanishing amount of information. The average precision in the market converges to zero as n goes to infinity. REMARK 2: From the formula for 1/v* it is immediate that the precision purchased is monotone in its cost. If c is zero, firms get perfect information (t* = 1 or v* = 0); as c increases t* (or 1/v*) decreases monotonically until c is so high that no information is purchased. Similarly, the equilibrium precision is monotonically increasing in the prior variance of demand (a2). More uncertainty induces the firms to acquire better information. The relationship between the slope of marginal costs (2X) and 1/v* is not monotonic. For X small and for X large expected profits at the market stage are low and consequently there is low expenditure on research. 1/v* peaks at intermediate values of X. It is increasing in X for low values of X and decreasing for high values.
Welfare
What is the first best outcome with costly acquisition of information? It is just the full information first best. In the continuum economy we can think of a center achieving the full information first best by pooling a continuum of iid signals of zero precision for which E(silO) = 0 since (conditional on 0) the true value 0 is obtained (almost surely) even if the error terms of the signals have infinite variance (this is just the statement of Kolmogorov's S.L.L.N. for our continuum economy). In terms of the replica markets as n goes to infinity the optimal expenditure on information converges to zero in per capita terms and the precision of the aggregate signal goes to infinity.11
In the continuum economy the first best per capita expected total surplus is given by ETS0 = bEO2/2 according to Table I, 1" Consider the n-replica market and suppose there is a center which purchases an aggregate signal Sn with precision l/wn. Given the pooled signal Sn expected per capita total surplus (gross of information costs) conditional on Sn is E(601n)x -(/3/2 + X)x2 where x is average production. which converges to infinity as n goes to infinity (and Tno converges to 1 as n --oo). Nevertheless the expenditure on information in per capita terms converges to zero as n goes to infinity since (c/nwno) -.-n 0. In the limit per capita expenditure on information is zero and the full information first best is achieved. We can reinterpret the center in the n-replica market as collecting n signals with precision l/ln and pooling them to form Sn-With constant returns to scale the analysis of market optimality is more delicate. We have found that in the continuum limit no equilibrium exists but nevertheless for any finite n equilibrium does exist and involves a vanishing but positive average expenditure on information. The question is: what is the limit of per capita total expected surplus as we replicate the market? From the proof of Proposition 5 and Remark 1 it is easily checked that the total precision of information in the market goes to infinity as we replicate the economy (it is of the order of magnitude VH) while the average expenditure on research goes to zero (it is of the order 1/ Vn). This implies that in the limit first best efficiency is obtained!'2 We can gain some intuition for this result as follows: Fix a large n; we know then that every firm buys a little bit of information. If firms were price takers almost an efficient outcome would obtain according to the results in Section 4; with constant returns (and the affine information structure) the market aggregates information and average expenditure on information is small. By increasing n firms eventually become price takers; they always buy some information, and the average expenditure on research goes to zero. The limit is thus the first best outcome. Li, McKelvey, and Page (1985) consider also information acquisition with a constant return technology but they do not replicate demand when the number of firms increases. They find that the aggregate purchase of information may be positive in the competitive limit even though individual firms purchases are zero. The welfare analysis indicates that the total amount of research undertaken by the market can be either too much, if the cost of research is low, or too little, if the cost of research is high. It is worth remarking that, when examining the convergence properties of equilibria without replicating demand, the "limit" market is not well defined. ((n-1)t?2)2 2+ Therefore per capita expected total surplus at the market equilibrium t* equals n ETSn = EGSn -c t* ETSn=EGSn-2 1 -t* As n goes to infinity t * converges to zero and nt * to infinity. This implies that ETSn n G(2 + a2)/2#, which is the first best level.
obtained by Li, McKelvey, and Page (1985) highlights the importance of the replica assumptions made when studying convergence issues. With decreasing returns nevertheless the market does attain the "second best" where expected total surplus is maximized given that firms can base decisions only on their private information. The intuitive explanation is as follows. From Proposition 2 we already know that the market is second best optimal at the second stage, given the expenditures on research. At the first stage there is no private information and with negligible players (a continuum of them) each firm has the right (second best) incentives to purchase information. Proposition 6 states the result. PROPOSITION 6: With endogenous information acquisition a competitive market with increasing marginal costs works like a team which chooses expenditures on information and decentralized production rules to maximize total expected surplus.
PROOF: Let X > 0. Contingent on a certain expenditure on research to get a precision of information t we know from Proposition 2 that the market works like a team to maximize expected gross surplus (gross of the cost of information) and therefore both attain EGS(t) = (aa2 + bMt2)/2, where a = t/(2X + ,Bt) (from Table I ). We show now that the market solves the program Max EGS(t) -co(t). 
Q.E.D.
REMARK: According to Proposition 6 there is no room for a planner to improve on market performance taking as given decentralized decision making. This contrasts with Laffont's analysis of rational expectations equilibria under asymmetric information (Laffont (1985) ). In his model, with a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium, there is scope for public intervention since individual private research decisions do not take into account the externality effect on the informativeness of prices. The externality issue arises since in the rational expectations model agents do condition on prices.
As a corollary to Proposition 6 we obtain that the welfare loss with respect to the first best is increasing in the cost of information. This is easily seen since with increasing marginal costs, the competitive market acts It may be thought that the inefficiency arises because we have modelled the market period as a one-shot affair and firms cannot learn about demand conditions from prices. We argue below that this is not the case.
REPEATED COMPETITION AND INFORMATION REVELATION THROUGH PRICES
Suppose now that we add another market period to our game in the continuum economy with increasing marginal costs. Firms purchase information at the first stage, compete in quantities contingent on the received signals at the second, observe the market price, and compete again in the last period. We claim that each firm purchasing precision t* at the first stage, producing x(si) = a(si -u) + b,i at the second where a = t*/(2X + ft*) (both as in the two-stage game), inferring 9 from the market price, and producing x = b9 at the third stage is an equilibrium path for the three-stage game.
To prove our claim suppose that firms have already chosen their precision of the information, ti, i E [0, 1]. Firm i at stage two will follow the strategy xi(si) = ai(si -u) + bu as in our previous two-stage game since in the continuum economy the firm cannot affect the market price through its quantity choice. The market price conditional on 9 will be then p = 9 -IZ(9) where x(9) is the average output, x(9) = d(9 -,u) + b,u with a = faidi = t/(2X + /3t) and t-= ftidi.13 Therefore p = 0(1 -,iB) -/3(b -a-),u and provided that 1 -fa-O 0, 9 can be obtained by observing the market price: 9 = (p + ,B(b -a-),)/(1 -3a-). af3 is always less than 1 except if X = 0. When 9 is revealed a full information competitive equilibrium obtains at the last stage, x = b9 and p = 2Xb9.
The incentives to purchase information in the three-stage model are identical to those in the two-stage case since, given the precision of the information of the 13To obtain the result use the fact that conditional on 9, ft,s, = t-by analogy to the fact that given 9, 1 t n I tn converges almost surely to 9 as n goes to infinity since E(s-n IO) = and it is easily seen that
Var (Sn I) -nO since Var(snIO)) < a2/4n. firms at the second stage, the same equilibrium as in the two-stage case obtains and the equilibrium at the third stage does not depend on previous information purchases. We have thus the same equilibrium behavior as before at the first two stages followed by a full information competitive equilibrium since the market price is fully revealing. It is worth noting that at the last stage a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium prevails but nevertheless firms have an incentive to purchase information since this affects expected profits at the second stage before the market price is observed (see Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1982) for an elaboration of this idea in a strategic market game context where they show that Nash equilibria of the continuum economy are fully revealing generically)."4 According to our model in large markets where firms learn from past prices the number of firms who choose to acquire costly information need not be small. In fact in our symmetric equilibrium all firms purchase precision t*. We see thus that the market inefficiency prevails when firms can learn from observed prices since their information content becomes only available the next period of economic activity.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have examined information aggregation in large Cournot markets where firms receive private signals about the uncertain demand and argued that the appropriate approach is to consider replica markets since that yields a well defined limit competitive market. Bayesian-Cournot equilibria are very easily characterized in the continuum market and closed form solutions can be obtained.
Our main contention is that large Cournot markets in general do not aggregate information efficiently. In a competitive market where firms receive private noisy signals there will be a welfare loss due to the incomplete information except if the technology exhibits constant returns. The market will underproduce if the true state of demand is high and will overproduce if it is low. Our analysis indicates that the full information competitive (or Walrasian) model need not be a good approximation of a large Cournot market with incomplete information if there are decreasing returns to scale and if the precision of the information of the firms is not close to perfect.
With decreasing returns to scale, if the information decision is endogenous and costly, then a further reason for market inefficiency is added and the welfare loss was shown to be increasing in the cost of information. With constant returns to scale, some subtle existence issues arise which underscore the importance of the replica assumptions made for the welfare analysis of markets with endogenous acquisition of information. The incentives to purchase information in a competitive market were also shown to be invariant to adding another market period where firms compete after having observed the previous market price (which turns out to be fully revealing). Q.E.D.
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